CaliToday (24/10/2025): When U.S. President Donald Trump last visited South Korea in 2019, he turned a routine diplomatic stop into a stunning piece of political theater. With a single, unorthodox invitation by tweet, he orchestrated an impromptu meeting with Kim Jong Un, stepping across the concrete border into North Korea and becoming the first sitting U.S. president to do so.
Now, as Trump prepares for his first trip to Asia since his return to the White House, speculation is rampant: Is the world about to witness Trump-Kim 4.0?
The president is set to visit Malaysia, Japan, and finally South Korea for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting. While no high-profile summit has been announced, the whispers of another border rendezvous are growing louder, fueled by recent tactical moves and a surprising thaw in rhetoric.
If realized, it would be their first summit since that surreal day at the Korean border village of Panmunjom in June 2019. But experts are deeply divided, warning that even if a meeting happens, the world has changed so dramatically that the outcome could be more dangerous than the impasse it seeks to solve.
The Thaw: Reading the Tea Leaves
On the surface, the signs are tantalizing.
South Korea's Unification Minister, Chung Dong-young, told lawmakers in mid-October that a meeting at the DMZ is "possible." Adding fuel to the fire, authorities recently suspended all civilian tours to the southern side of Panmunjom a logistical step that often precedes high-security events at the border.
Then there is the rhetoric. Trump has consistently boasted of his personal relationship with Kim, calling him "a smart guy" and expressing his desire to restore diplomacy.
More surprisingly, Kim himself broke his long silence on Trump last month. The North Korean leader said he held "good personal memories" of the U.S. president. He even suggested a return to talks is possible, with one massive condition: the U.S. must drop "its delusional obsession with denuclearization."
"We should see prospects for their meeting have increased," said Ban Kil Joo, an assistant professor at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, citing the tour suspension and Kim's comments.
And for those who doubt a meeting could be arranged so quickly? Observers note the 2019 get-together was arranged in just one day.
Kim's New Leverage: This is Not 2019
Despite the hopeful signals, many experts argue an impromptu meeting is unlikely this time. The reason: Kim Jong Un is in a far more powerful position than he was in 2019, and his urgency for talks has evaporated.
Since the 2019 talks collapsed over U.S.-led sanctions, Kim has been busy. He has aggressively accelerated the expansion of his nuclear-capable missile arsenal, testing weapons designed to strike the U.S. mainland and its regional allies.
More critically, he has strengthened his diplomatic footprint, aligning closely with Russia over its war in Ukraine and tightening relations with China. With sanctions enforcement weakening and powerful new friends at his back, Kim’s leverage is greater than ever.
"Considering the current situation, it seems difficult to imagine Kim Jong Un coming over for talks," said Kim Tae-hyung, a professor at Seoul’s Soongsil University.
Kim’s goal is no longer just sanctions relief; it is global acceptance. He clearly wants the U.S. to acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear power a status that would, in his view, justify the full lifting of U.N. sanctions. This is a red line that the U.S. and its allies have long sworn they will never cross.
The "Small Deal" Dilemma
This new power dynamic has set the stage for a dangerous compromise that haunts officials in Seoul and Tokyo: the "small deal."
In this scenario, Trump, eager for a diplomatic "win" he can "brag" about, might agree to a limited deal. In return for extensive sanctions relief, Kim would agree to freeze or dismantle only his long-range missiles the ones that threaten the U.S. homeland.
Such a deal would allow Kim to keep his entire arsenal of short-range and tactical nuclear missiles, all of which are pointed directly at South Korea and Japan.
The debate over this possibility is splitting the foreign policy community:
1. The Pragmatic View: Kim Taewoo, a former head of South Korea's Institute of National Unification, argues "such a small deal" would still benefit South Korea. Why? Because decades of efforts to achieve complete denuclearization have failed. Furthermore, he poses a chilling question: If North Korea can strike the U.S., would America really risk its own cities to defend Seoul? By taking U.S. cities off the table, a small deal ironically makes the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" more credible.
2. The Doomsday View: Chung Jin-young, a former dean at Kyung Hee University, counters that this is a fantasy. He argues there is "virtually no chance" North Korea will ever give up its nuclear program. Giving Kim sanctions relief for a partial freeze would be seen as a catastrophic failure, legitimizing his nuclear status. The fallout, Chung warns, would be immediate: it would "trigger calls in South Korea and Japan for their countries to also be allowed to have nuclear weapons," igniting a regional arms race.
Even if a meeting doesn't happen around the APEC summit, many believe the two leaders will eventually sit down. Kim may see the unorthodox Trump as the only U.S. leader willing to grant him the status he craves. And Trump, beset by domestic woes, may see Kim as his best shot at a legacy-defining diplomatic achievement.
The speculation will continue, but the stakes of the game have fundamentally changed. The question is no longer just if they will meet, but what concessions Trump is willing to make—and what allies he is willing to risk to declare a victory.
